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Abstract Dual-channel supply chain structure, i.e., a traditional retail channel added by an online direct
channel, is widely adopted by a lot of rms, including some companies selling deteriorating products (e.g.
fruits, vegetables and meats, etc.). However, few papers in literature consider deterioration property of
products in dual-channel business models. In this paper, a single-retailer-single-vendor dual-channel supply
chain model is studied, in which the vendor sells deteriorating products through its direct online channel and
the indirect retail channel. In addition to quantity deterioration, quality of the products also drops with time
and aects the demand rate in the retail channel. The pricing decisions and the inventory decisions for the
two rms are simultaneously studied. Models of centralized (i.e., the two rms make decisions jointly) and
decentralized (i.e., the two rms make decisions separately, vendor as the Stackelberg leader) problems are
established. Proper algorithms are proposed to obtain the optimal decisions of prices, ordering frequencies
and ordering quantities. The results suggest that decentralization of the supply chain not only erodes the
two rms' prot, but also incurs higher wastes comparing to that under centralization. However, a revenue
sharing and two part tari contract can coordinate the supply chain. Under utilizing the contract, each
rm's prot is improved and the total waste rate of the supply chain is reduced. It is also shown that
the contract is more ecient for both rms under higher product deterioration rate. Besides, the contract
is more ecient for the retailer, while less ecient for the vendor under higher quality dropping rate. In
the model extension, online channel delivery time is assumed to be endogenous and linked to demands in
both channels. The results show that products' deterioration rate and quality dropping rate have signicant
impacts to the rms' delivery time decisions, as well as the pricing and inventory decisions.
Keywords Dual channel supply chain  Product deterioration  Game theory  Pricing  Inventory
1 Introduction
With the fast development of Internet and information technology, customers' purchasing behaviors have
been changed a lot, which pushes more and more rms in various industries to establish direct selling channels
in addition to the traditional `Brick-and-Mortar' channels. By establishing direct channels, companies can
often benet from the expanded market coverage (Chen et al., 2012), the enhanced control power over
retail price (Chiang et al., 2003), etc. According to a survey, about 42% of the top PC manufacturers (like
2Dell, Sony, Compaq, Lenovo, etc.) are selling through their own direct channels (Wilder, 1999; Tsay &
Agrawal, 2004). Today, in the fresh food industry, with developed preservation and logistic technologies,
many companies are selling their goods to customers through the direct online channel. For the grocery giant
Wal-Mart, fresh foods are sold through Chinese e-commerce partner Yihaodian in Shanghai and Beijing 1.
Also, Harry and David, as one of Internet Retailer 500 and America's leading gourmet gifting companies,
sells fresh foods through both direct and retail channels. Nowadays, in China, more and more customers
choose to buy fruits on e-commerce websites, including Alibaba, Taobao and Tmall, etc. Khuntonthong et al.
(2013) demonstrated that the development of e-commerce techniques gives farmers more opportunities to
benet from perishable agricultural foods.
As fresh-selling through dual-channel is becoming more and more popular, the research on the manage-
ment of dual-selling for deteriorating products is required and urgent. However, most of the previous studies
on dual-channel problems concentrate on the single period pricing problems. Since the product deterioration
is a time linked phenomenon, most of their models cannot characterize product deterioration appropriately.
A common way to study product deterioration is to use the EOQ models.2 So, in this paper, in addition to
the pricing decisions, inventory decisions are considered for deterioration items. In the centralized model,
the vendor and the retailer are vertically integrated. They make decisions together on both the prices of
the two channels and the inventory for the whole supply chain. In addition to the centralized model, a
decentralized model is studied, in which, the vendor and the retailer competes vertically and horizontally
on pricing and ordering decisions. In the game, the vendor is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the
follower. Also, a revenue sharing and two part tari contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain,
which can not only raise both rms' prots, but also reduce the total waste of the whole supply chain. In the
model extension, a more realistic model is studied, in which the direct channel delivery time is endogenous.
The main research questions in this paper can be summarized as:
(1) How to obtain the optimal decisions under both centralized and decentralized supply chains?
(2) How does the optimal decisions change with the critical parameters (e.g., deterioration rate, compe-
tition intensity, etc.)?
(3) Can the revenue sharing and two part tari contract coordinate the supply chain? If so, how to
determine the optimal contract parameters?
(4) How to decide the optimal delivery time when it is endogenous?
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 introduces
the notations and assumptions through the paper. Then, the centralized and decentralized models are
formulated. To solve the models, two algorithms are also proposed. In section 4, numerical examples and
sensitivity analysis are presented, along with some important results and interesting managerial implications.
In section 5, a revenue sharing and two part tari contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain.
Section 6 is the model extension. In the last section, conclusions for the paper are presented, and some
future research topics are suggested.
1 Russel, J. (Jul 22, 2015) Walmart Takes Full Control Of Yihaodian, Its Online Retail Business In China.
https://techcrunch.com/2015/07/22/walmart-buys-out-its-chinese-store-yihaodian/. Accessed on November 7, 2016
2 The EOQ theory enables people to consider the transaction costs (e.g. deterioration cost, transportation cost, inventory
holding cost, ordering cost) which have great impacts to pricing and ordering decisions for supply chain members. According
to Moss et al. (2003), transaction cost (including deterioration cost, transportation cost, inventory holding cost, ordering
cost, etc.) is an important factor for the application of e-commerce business structures. The ignorance of the transaction
cost may result in non-optimal decisions.
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2 Literature review
This paper is closely linked to two streams: (1) dual channel supply chain models (2) EOQ/EPQ models
with product deterioration.
One stream of literature is about the research of dual-channel business models. In recent couple of
years, dual-channel business model has been deeply studied by researchers on supply chain management
and marketing. Chiang et al. (2003) argued that the motivation of adding a direct channel is to reduce the
double marginalization eects. Yan & Pei (2009) pointed out that establishing a direct channel is a useful
tool for the manufacture to motivate the retailer's service level improvement, and to enhance the eciency
of the total supply chain. In addition to the pricing decisions, researchers consider about other important
and realistic factors, such as direct channel delivery lead time, service level for both channels, demand
disruption, asymmetric information, etc. Hua et al. (2010) showed that in a dual-channel supply, lead time
has strong eect on both parties' pricing and quantity decisions. Xu et al. (2012) extended Chiang et al.
(2003) by treating the delivery time length of the online channel as a decision variable. They also showed
that lead time decision has eects to the manufacturer's channel selections. Yang et al. (2017) studied a
dual-channel Newsvendor model with lead time linked demand and customers' switching behaviors when
shortage occurs. Chen et al. (2017) studied the quality decisions in addition to the pricing decisions in
a dual-channel supply chain. They showed that adding another channel can improve the product quality
and the supply chain performance. Xiao et al. (2014) investigated the product variety design and pricing
decisions for a two level supply chain in a circular spatial market under manufacturer-lead and retailer-lead
Stackelberg gaming. They found that the motivation for the manufacturer to use dual channels decreases
with the unit production cost, while increases with the marginal cost of variety design, the retailer's marginal
selling cost, and the customers' t cost. Cai et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2012) did excellent study on
channel selection policies under dierent values of selling costs, potential market share and competition
intensity. Dumrongsiri et al. (2008) found that a higher retail service level or customer service sensitivity
can benet both parties when demand is price and service dependent. Li & Li (2016) studied a dual-channel
supply chain with retailer's service investment and fairness concerns. Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008) studied
a dual-channel model with a value adding retailer who has private information of the value adding costs.
They found that a lower cost for the retailer can induce the information sharing throughout the supply
chain. Dan et al. (2012) argued that the market share and the customers' loyalty of retail channel has great
inuence to the pricing and service decisions. Liu et al. (2015) studied the manufacturer's and retailer's risk
aversion behaviors under asymmetric information to the optimal decisions. Yan et al. (2016) studied the
optimal pricing in a dual-channel supply chain with a dominant retailer and two manufacturers, in which
the manufacturers lie about their cost information. Li et al. (2016a) studied the pricing and coordination
problems in a dual-channel supply chain with a risk-averse retailer. Liu et al. (2010) demonstrated that
when selling cost information is private, centralized decision is not always better than the decentralized
decision with a feasible contract if the retailer has lower selling cost. Chiang & Monahan (2005) found that
when demand is uncertain and demand can be transferred from one channel to another, dual-channel is
better than either the pure retail channel or the pure direct channel. Yu et al. (2016) studied the impacts of
the e-tailer's drop-shipping decisions to the manufacturer's distribution channel strategies. He et al. (2014)
studied the transshipment strategies between the e-store and the retailer under demand uncertainties in
4both channels. Xiao & Shi (2016) studied the optimal pricing decisions in the presence of supply shortage
under dierent supply priority of each channel. Yue & Liu (2006) found that for uncertain demand, the gap
of demand estimated by the manufacture and that by the retailer has signicant impacts on the benet of
both parties. Huang et al. (2012) found that when demand is disrupted and the demand disruption level falls
in an interval, the optimal production quantity decision is robust. Choi et al. (2013) studied the decisions
under dierent power structures of the dual-channel supply chain when products can be recycled. Matsui
(2015) studied the channel strategies (single channel or dual channel) of two competing manufacturers. They
showed that, the symmetry of the two manufacturers can result in asymmetry equilibrium. Matsui (2017)
studied the optimal decision sequence of the direct price and wholesale price in a dual-channel supply chain.
They showed that the manufacturer should announce its direct price before or upon the wholesale price. Lu
& Liu (2015) studied the entry of an external e-commerce channel to the manufacturer's channel selections.
Li et al. (2016b) studied the pricing, greenness and manufacturer's channel selections in a dual channel green
supply chain. He et al. (2016) studied the carbon emissions in a dual-channel supply chain in the presence of
customers' free riding behaviors. Ji et al. (2017) studied manufacturer's carbon emission reduction eorts,
pricing and channel selection decisions in a dual-channel supply chain. Takahashi et al. (2011) studied the
inventory decisions in a two echelon dual-channel supply considering the manufacturer's and retailer's stock
setup and delivery decisions. Rodriguez & Aydin (2015) studied the pricing and assortment decisions in
a dual-channel supply chain. Chen (2015) studied the cooperative advertising strategies in a dual-channel
supply chain. Xie et al. (2017) coordinated the dual-channel supply chain in the presence of cooperative
advertising with a revenue sharing contract. Batar et al. (2016) studied a centralized decision model with
price competition between the two channels. In addition to the pricing decisions, they also studied the
inventory decisions. Their research is closely related to this paper. However, this paper is dierent from
Batar et al. (2016) in two aspects. Firstly, product deterioration is considered in this paper, which was
seldom considered in previous research, including Batar et al. (2016). Secondly, in Batar et al. (2016),
they studied an integrated model. However, this paper also studies a decentralized model, in which both
horizontal and vertical competitions between the vendor and the retailer are considered.
In addition to the competition problems, researchers also studied the coordination of the decentralized
supply chain with revenue sharing contracts (Yan, 2008; Cai, 2010; Xie et al., 2017), two-part tari and prot
sharing contracts (Chen et al., 2012), price discount contracts (Cai et al., 2009) under dierent situations.
In this paper, a revenue sharing and two part tari contract is proposed to coordinate the dual channel
supply chain with product deterioration. Summary of the related literature on dual-channel supply chain is
shown in Tab.1. To our best knowledge, this paper is the rst that consider product deterioration, inventory
decision, supply chain coordination simultaneously in a dual-channel supply chain.
Another related stream of literature is EOQ/EPQ models for deteriorating products. Summary of the
related literature on dual-channel supply chain is shown in Tab.2. According to Shah et al. (2013), deteri-
oration is dened as decay, change or spoilage so that the items are not in its initial conditions. There are
two categories of deterioration items. The rst category refers to the items that become decayed, damaged
or expired with time, e.g., meat, vegetables, fruits, medicine, etc. The second category is the items that lose
part or total value with time, e.g., computer chips, mobile phones, fashion and seasonal products, etc. Both
kinds of items have short life cycles and after a period of existence in market, the items lose the original
economical value due to the drop of consumer preference, product quality, etc. Ghare & Schrader (1963)
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Tab. 1 Related literature on dual-channel supply chain
Research paper Pricing Inventory policy SC coordination Others
Chiang et al. (2003)
p
Chen et al. (2012)
p p
Choi et al. (2013)
p p
Cai et al. (2009)
p
Chiang & Monahan (2005)
p p
Chen (2015)
p
Cooperative advertising
Xie et al. (2017)
p p
Cooperation advertising
Yan & Pei (2009)
p
Retailer service
Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008)
p
Retailer service, information sharing
Dan et al. (2012)
p
Retailer service
Li & Li (2016)
p
Retail service
Hua et al. (2010)
p
Lead time
Xu et al. (2012)
p
Lead time
Yang et al. (2017)
p
Lead time, stochastic demand
Xiao et al. (2014)
p
Product variety
Dumrongsiri et al. (2008)
p
Stochastic demand
Xiao & Shi (2016)
p
Uncertain supply, channel priority
Li et al. (2016a)
p p
Risk aversion
Liu et al. (2015)
p
Risk aversion
Yue & Liu (2006)
p
Information sharing
Huang et al. (2012)
p
Demand disruption
He et al. (2014)
p
Transshipment, stochastic demand
Liu et al. (2010)
p
Stochastic demand, information sharing
Chen et al. (2017)
p
Quality decision
Yu et al. (2016)
p
Drop shipping strategy
Matsui (2015)
p
Competition of two manufacturers
Matsui (2017)
p
Pricing sequence decision
Lu & Liu (2015)
p
External e-commerce competition
Yan et al. (2016)
p
Retailer dominated SC
Li et al. (2016b)
p
Product greenness
He et al. (2016)
p
Product greenness, free-riding behavior
Ji et al. (2017)
p
Product greenness
Takahashi et al. (2011)
p
Delivery decisions
Rodriguez & Aydin (2015)
p p
Assortment planning
Batar et al. (2016)
p p p
This paper
p p p
Product deterioration
Tab. 2 Related literature on deteriorating inventory models
Research paper Pricing Deterioration SC level Others
Ghare & Schrader (1963) Quantity One
Sarker et al. (1997) Quantity One Inventory-level dependent demand
Giri et al. (2003) Quantity One Ramp type demand
Sana et al. (2004) Quantity One Demand shortage
Dye et al. (2006) Quantity One Demand backlogging
Chen & Chen (2007) Quantity Three Multi-item
Lo et al. (2007) Quantity Two Integrated decision
Skouri et al. (2009) Quantity One Weibull deterioration rate
Thangam & Uthayakumar (2009)
p
Quantity Two Trade credit
Lin et al. (2009)
p
Quantity Two Cooperative decision
Lin et al. (2010)
p
Quantity Two Cooperative decision
Hsu et al. (2010) Quantity One Preservation investment
Liang & Zhou (2011) Quantity One Two warehouse, trade credit
Wang et al. (2011) Quantity Three Time dependent deterioration rate
Sarkar (2011) Quantity One Trade credit, demand shortage
Mahata (2012) Quantity One Trade credit
Sarkar (2012a) Quantity One Trade credit
Dye & Hsieh (2012) Quantity One Preservation investment
Dye & Hsieh (2013) Quantity One Preservation investment
Sarkar et al. (2013)
p
Quantity One Component cost
Sarkar & Sarkar (2013) Quantity One Probabilistic deterioration
Shah et al. (2013)
p
Quantity One Non-instantaneous deterioration
Sarkar (2013) Quantity Two Probabilistic deterioration
Qin et al. (2014)
p
Quantity and quality One Fresh produce
Chauhan & Singh (2015) Quantity One Cash ow discount
Sarkar et al. (2015) Quantity One Fixed lifetime
Zhang et al. (2015)
p
Quantity Two Preservation investment
This paper
p
Quantity and quality Two Dual channel supply chain
6rst proposed an exponentially decaying inventory model. Based on their work, people had done a lot on
the EOQ problems for deterioration products. In this research area, dierent settings of critical factors,
e.g., demand rate, deterioration rate, pricing strategies, etc., have signicant impacts on the formulation
of the models, and the associated solutions and results. Firstly, for demand rate, it can either be a con-
stant parameter (Mahata, 2012) or be a time dependent parameter (Giri et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2011;
Dye et al., 2006; Sarkar, 2012a). Also, demand can be backlogged (Dye et al., 2006), inventory level linked
(Burwell et al., 1997; Sarker et al., 1997) or price sensitive (Shah et al., 2013; Dye & Hsieh, 2012; Liang &
Zhou, 2011). Secondly, for deterioration rate, it can be a constant parameter (Sana et al., 2004; Thangam &
Uthayakumar, 2009; Liang & Zhou, 2011; Sarkar, 2013; Sarkar et al., 2013), a time linked parameter (Skouri
et al., 2009; Sarkar et al., 2015; Sarkar, 2011) , preservation investment linked parameter (Hsu et al., 2010;
Dye & Hsieh, 2013) or a stochastic parameter (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2013; Sarkar, 2013, 2012b).
The above research only consider the single stage inventory problems. Some people studied the problems
in multi level supply chains. Lee & Moon (2006) proposed a basic three level producer-vendor-buyer model.
Wang et al. (2011) extended Lee & Moon (2006) by assuming that products suers from time linked
deterioration rate. Besides, many researchers did a lot of work on integrated inventory and/or pricing
decisions (Lo et al., 2007; Chen & Chen, 2007; Noh et al., 2016; Sarkar et al., 2016), Stackelberg gaming
problems (Song & Zhao, 2010), and cooperation strategies (Lin et al., 2009, 2010; Sarkar, 2016) in multi-level
supply chains.
To the best of our knowledge, models and analysis in this paper is novel and dierent from the extent
papers on dual-channel supply chain. The main contributions of this paper are quadruple. Firstly, product
deterioration is considered in a dual channel supply chain, which is rarely mentioned in previous literature
on dual channel supply chain. Moreover, two kinds of product deterioration is considered, i.e., the quantity
deterioration and the quality deterioration. The quantity deterioration aects the rms' inventories, whereas
the quality deterioration aects customers' choices and demand rate. The problem is modeled over an
innite time horizon, which enables us to better characterize the products' deterioration property. Secondly,
pricing and inventory decisions are studied simultaneously in the dual channel supply chain, which is seldom
considered in previous papers. Thirdly, endogenous direct channel delivery time is also studied in the dual-
channel supply chain selling deteriorating products. The endogenous direct channel delivery time is studied
by Hua et al. (2010) and Xu et al. (2012). However, how product deterioration aects the pricing, inventory
and delivery time decisions are unclear in their research. So, based on their work, the endogenous delivery
lead time problem is studied in a dual channel supply chain under product deterioration. Lastly, it is found
that a revenue sharing and two part tari contract can perfectly coordinate the dual channel supply chain
with proper coordinating strategies.
3 Model formulation and solution analysis
The dual-channel supply chain consists of a vendor and a retailer. The supply chain structure is presented
in Fig. 1(a), in which the vendor distributes the products to customers through both the online channel
and the retail channel (Chiang et al., 2003; Xu et al., 2012). As introduced above, the two parties' inventory
systems are also considered, which are shown in Fig.1(b). The mathematical models of the problems are
formulated and algorithms are proposed to solve the models in the following subsections.
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(a) Supply chain structure (b) Inventory system
Fig. 1 (a) Supply chain structure; (b) Inventory level with respect to time for the vendor and the retailer
3.1 Notation
Notation in this paper are presented in Tab.2.
3.2 Model formulation
Assuming that the vendor is the leader of the supply chain. Firstly, the vendor procures a large quantity
of deteriorating products, noted by Qv. Then the vendor sells the products to the downstream retailer, as
well as to the end customers through direct channel. Under receiving the ordered products, the retailer sells
the products to the customers. Customers can purchase the products either from the direct channel or the
retail channel. As shown in Fig.1(b), the vendor's inventory level depletes due to three reasons: the direct
channel demand, the retail channel orders and deteriorated quantities. The retailer's inventory depletes due
to retail channel demand and product deterioration.
Firstly, a centralized model is studied , i.e., the vendor and the retailer are vertically integrated. There
are four decision variables: the retail price pr, the direct channel price pv, the vendor's inventory scale
parameter n and the retailer's ordering cycle length T . Then, a decentralized model is studied, in which the
vendor acts as the Stackelberg leader and the retailer as the follower. In this gaming problem, both of the
vendor and the retailer make their own decisions to maximize their individual prot. The gaming sequence
is: (1) The vendor announces the wholesale price w, the direct sale price pv and the scale parameter n.
(2) The retailer sets selling price pr and ordering cycle length T under knowing the vendor's announced
decisions.
Following the studies of Yue & Liu (2006), Huang & Swaminathan (2009), Hua et al. (2010) and Chen
et al. (2012), demand functions of the two channels are linear in self and cross price aects with the same
sensitive parameters. In addition to quantity deterioration, quality deterioration is also considered in this
paper. Following the study of Wang & Li (2012), Fibich et al. (2003), Kopalle et al. (1996) and Sorger
(1988), we assume that the product quality is exponentially decreasing with time with a rate of . Also, it is
8Tab. 3 Notation
Decision variables
pv price of the direct channel, $/unit
pr price of the retail channel, $/unit
T retailer's replenishment cycle time, day
n multiple of retailer's cycle time, an integer number.
w wholesale price of the vendor, $/unit
 sharing rate of retailer's revenue to the vendor.
F a lump sum fee transferred from the vendor to the retailer, $
L delivery lead time in the direct channel, day.
Constant parameters
 deterioration rate of vendor and retailer.
 quality dropping rate.
a total potential market size.
 direct channel market share. The retail channel market share is 1  .
b coecient of the price elasticity of demand rate.
r degree of product substitution of the two channels.
cv vendor's purchasing cost per unit item, $/unit
hv; hr vendor's and retailer's holding cost per unit item per unit time, respec-
tively, $/unit/day
Av; Ar vendor's and retailer's xed cost per order, respectively, including or-
der processing cost, transportation cost, warehouse operating cost, etc,
$/time
 vendor's bargain power. Retailer's bargain power is 1  , 0    1.
cL investment to reduce delivery time, which is formulated as cL =
s3
L+s4
.
s3 and s4 are constant parameters, $/time
Dependent variables
Dv; Dr vendor's and retailer's demand rate, respectively.
Qv vendor's ordering quantity.
Qrj retailer's ordering quantity in phase j(j = 1; 2; :::; n).
Tv vendor's replenishment cycle time, Tv = nT .
Ivj(t); Irj(t) vendor's and retailer's inventory level with respect to time in the jth
phase, respectively, where j = 1; 2; :::; n.
SRv; SRr vendor's and retailer's total sales revenue, respectively.
WRv vendor's wholesale total revenue.
HCv; HCr vendor's and retailer's total inventory holding cost, respectively.
PCv; PCr vendor's and retailer's total purchasing cost, respectively.
OCv; OCr vendor's and retailer's ordering cost, respectively.
HQv;HQr vendor's and retailer's accumulated holding quantity in a single cycle,
respectively.
TPv; TPr; TPsc vendor's, retailer's and supply chain's per unit time prot, respectively.
r; v; sc percentage prot increase for retailer ,vendor and supply chain.
qc; qd total average ordered quantity for centralized and decentralized model,
respectively.
D
c
; D
d
total average demand for centralized and decentralized model, respec-
tively.
B(F ) Nash bargain function.
realistic that retail channel buyers can touch the products and feel the quality changes (especially for fresh
vegetables, meats and fruits). So, the retail channel demand is linked to the products' real time quality.
Base on the assumptions, the demand functions in both channels can be formulated as:
Dv(pv; pr) = a  bpv + rpr; (1)
Dr(pv; pr) = [(1  )a  bpr + rpv]e t; t 2 [0; nT ]: (2)
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In the following analysis, for notational convenience, demand rate of the vendor's direct channel is
marked by Dv, and that of the retail channel is marked by Dr. Also, the initial demand rate of the retail
channel (i.e., (1  )a  bpr + rpv) is noted as dr. The demand rates of the two channels are linked to the
selling prices in both channels. The total potential market size is a.  (0 <  < 1 ) denotes the customer's
preference for the direct channel, and a higher  means more customers will choose the direct channel.
Parameter b is the coecient of the price elasticity of demand rate. Parameter r indicates the degree of the
substitution of the products sold via the two channels. To make sure own price eect is greater than cross
price eect, the condition b > r should be satised. The parameter  denotes the quality dropping rate. For
a higher , the product quality drops more fast with time. Specially, when t = 0, the product quality is 1,
which means the product is totally fresh.
To concentrate on the research targets and to ease the analysis, other assumptions should be made.
(1) In the base model, the vendor's direct channel delivery time is assumed to be zero. This assumption is
relaxed in the model extension by assuming the delivery time is endogenous and it will aect demands in
both channels (Hua et al., 2010).
(2) Shortages in both channels are not allowed.
(3) Time horizon is innite for the vendor and the retailer.
(4) The market size and deterioration rate do not change with time.
(5) No cost is incurred to deal with the deteriorated products. When products are deteriorated, rms will
throw them away without any cost.
3.3 Retailer's prot
In this subsection, the retailer's prot is calculated. According to previous studies on deteriorating inventory
problems, based on the inventory system depicted in Fig.1(b), some calculations about the inventory level,
the ordering quantities, and the total inventory holding quantities for the retailer can be made.
Following Ghare & Schrader (1963), the retailer's inventory level in phase j satises the dierential
equation
_Irj(t) =  Irj(t)  dre t; t 2 [(j   1)T; jT ]; j = 1; 2; :::; n: (3)
with boundary conditions Irj(t = jT ) = 0, Irj [t = (j   1)T ] = Qrj . The inventory level with respect to
time t can be derived by solving dierential equation (3) as
Irj(t) =
dr
    (e
( )jT   e( )t)e t; t 2 [(j   1)T; jT ]; j = 1; 2; :::; n: (4)
The ordering quantities of the retailer in phase j can be obtained by equating t to (j   1)T , that is
Qrj = Irj [t = (j   1)T ] = dr
    (e
( )T   1)e (j 1)T ; j = 1; 2; :::; n: (5)
The retailer's total inventory holding quantities in phase j is
HQrj =
Z jT
(j 1)T
Irj(t)dt =
dr
   

eT   1

  e
T   1


e jT ; j = 1; 2; :::; n: (6)
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After obtaining the inventory level, the ordering quantities, and the total inventory holding quantities,
the related revenue and the costs of the retailer can be obtained as follows.
(1) Retailer's total sales revenue (SRr )
The retailer's total revenue comes from the sales of the deteriorating products. The total sales revenue in a
cycle (t 2 [0; nT ]) can be calculated as
SRr = pr
Z nT
0
Drdt = prdr
1  e nT

: (7)
(2) Retailer's total holding cost ( HCr)
After receiving the ordered products from the vendor, the retailer stores its products in the inventory. The
retailer needs to pay for the holding cost for its inventory. The total inventory holding cost in an ordering
cycle can be calculated as
HCr = hr
nX
j=1
HQrj = hr
dr
   

eT   1

  e
T   1


1  e nT
eT   1 : (8)
(3)Retailer's total purchasing cost ( PCr)
The retailer purchases its products from the vendor with the wholesale price w. Thus, the total purchasing
cost for the retailer in an ordering cycle can be calculated as
PCr = w
nX
j=1
Qrj = w
dr
    (e
( )T   1)1  e
 nT
1  e T : (9)
(4) Retailer's total ordering cost ( OCr)
When ordering from the vendor, the retailer need to pay a lump sum fee Ar per time. In the cycle t 2 [0; nT ],
it will order n times. So the total ordering cost in n phases is
OCr = nAr: (10)
Based on the revenue and cost functions described above, the total prot per unit time for the retailer
can be obtained
TPr(pr; T ) =
1
nT
[SRr   PCr  HCr  OCr]
=
1
nT
fprdr 1  e
 nT

 hr dr
   

eT   1

  e
T   1


1  e nT
eT   1
 w dr
    (e
( )T   1)1  e
 nT
1  e T
 nArg: (11)
The rst part of retailer's prot is the sales revenue. The second part is the retailer's total inventory
cost. The fourth part is the total purchasing cost. The last part is the xed ordering cost.
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3.4 Vendor's prot
In this subsection, the vendor's prot is calculated. In practice, vendors usually have inventory holding
cost advantage over retailers. So, for the vendor, the replenishment cycle (Tv) is much longer than that of
the retailer, which is n times as much as the retailer's ordering cycle (i.e., Tv = nT ). It is more complex
for the calculation of the vendor's ordering quantity and total inventory holding quantity in time interval
t 2 [0; nT ]. There are n phases in the vendor's inventory system. For every phase j,(j = 1; 2; :::; n), the
vendor's inventory level satises the following dierential equation.
_Ivj(t) =  Ivj(t) Dv; t 2 [(j   1)T; jT ]; j = 1; 2; :::; n: (12)
with boundary conditions (1) Iv(j 1)[t = (j   1)T ]   Ivj [t = (j   1)T ] = Qrj for j = 2; 3; :::; n, (2)
Ivn(t = nT ) = 0 and (3) Iv1(t = 0) = Qv  Qr1.
Lemma 1 The inventory level for the vendor in a cycle in phase j is
Ivj(t) =
Dv

(e(nT t)   1) + dr
    (e
( )nT   e( )jT )e t; t 2 [(j   1)T; jT ] (13)
in which, j = 1; 2; :::; n.
After obtaining the vendor's inventory level, the total inventory holding quantity in phase j can be
calculated as
HQvj =
Z jT
(j 1)T
Ivj(t)dt =
Dve
nT (eT   1)
2
e jT   DvT

+
dr(e
T   1)
(   ) (e
( )nT e jT   e jT ): (14)
The total inventory holding quantity in time interval t 2 [0; nT ] can be calculated as
HQv =
nX
j=1
HQvj = Dv
enT   nT   1
2
+
dr
(   )

e( )nT (1  e nT ) + (eT   1)1  e
 nT
1  eT

: (15)
As shown in Fig. 1(b), at time zero, the vendor receives quantity Qv and then transport Qr1 to the
retailer. Then, the rest of the quantity is stocked in the vendor's warehouse. According to equation (13), the
initial inventory level can be calculated as Iv1(t = 0). So, the vendor's ordering quantity can be obtained as
Qv = Iv1(t = 0) +Qr1 =
Dv

(enT   1) + dr
    (e
( )nT   1): (16)
After obtaining the inventory level, the ordering quantities, and the total inventory holding quantities,
the revenue and cost of the vendor can be expressed as follows.
(1) Vendor's total sales revenue (SRv )
The vendor's revenue comes from both channels. It gains revenue by selling to customers through direct
channel. The total revenue in a cycle can be calculated as
SRv = pvDvnT: (17)
(2) Vendor's total wholesale revenue (WRv )
The vendor also gains revenue by wholesaling products to the downstream retailer, which can be expressed
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as
WRv = w
nX
j=1
Qrj = w
dr
    (e
( )T   1)1  e
 nT
1  e T : (18)
(3) Vendor's total inventory holding cost (HCv )
During the selling period, the unsold products are stored in the warehouse. The vendor needs to pay for
holding the inventory. The total inventory holding cost in a selling cycle can be calculated as
HCv = hvHQv = hvDv
enT   nT   1
2
+ hv
dr
(   )

e( )nT (1  e nT ) + (eT   1)1  e
 nT
1  eT

:
(19)
(4) Vendor's total purchasing cost (PCv )
Before selling the products, the vendor needs to replenish a large quantity of products from its upstream
suppliers, such as some large farms or food producers, which a unit replenishment cost of cv. Thus, the total
purchasing cost in a cycle can be calculated as
PCv = cvQv = cv
Dv

(enT   1) + cv dr
    (e
( )nT   1): (20)
(5) Vendor's ordering cost ( OCv)
When ordering from the suppliers, the vendor need to pay a lump sum fee, which is
OCv = Av: (21)
Based on the elements described above, the total prot per unit time for the vendor is
TPv(pv; w; n) =
1
nT
[SRv +WRv  HCv   PCv  OCv]
=
1
nT
fpvDvnT
+w
dr
    (e
( )T   1)1  e
 nT
1  e T
 hvDv e
nT   nT   1
2
  hv dr
(   )

e( )nT (1  e nT ) + (eT   1)1  e
 nT
1  eT

 cvDv

(enT   1)  cv dr
    (e
( )nT   1)
 Avg: (22)
The rst part of vendor's prot is the sales revenue from the direct online channels. The second part
is the wholesale revenue from the retail channel. The third part is the vendor's total inventory cost in an
ordering cycle. The fourth part is the total purchasing cost for the vendor in a cycle. The last part is the
xed cost in a cycle.
3.5 Analysis of the centralized problem
In this subsection, a centralized dual-channel supply chain is considered, in which the vendor and the retailer
are vertically integrated. In this case, the wholesale price is only used to divide the total prot between the
vendor and the retailer. The decision variables are pv, pr, n and T . The unit time total prot function of
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the supply chain is
TPsc(pv; pr; n; T ) = TPv + TPr
=
1
nT
fpvDvnT + prdr 1  e
 nT

 hvDv e
nT   nT   1
2
  hv dr
(   )

e( )nT (1  e nT ) + (eT   1)1  e
 nT
1  eT

 hr dr
   

eT   1

  e
T   1


1  e nT
eT   1
 cvDv

(enT   1)  cv dr
    (e
( )nT   1)
 nAr  Avg: (23)
The problem is to maximize the above function by nding optimal values of pv, pr, n and T . Through
analysis, the following proposition can be obtained.
Proposition 1 When  and  are relatively small,
(1) For constant n and T , TPsc is jointly concave in pv and pr.The optimal price in the direct and retail
channel can be respectively expressed as
pcv  B2r + 2bB1X1 + rX1B2   arX1   arX
2
1 + arX
2
1   2abX1 + arX1
r2X21   4b2X1 + 2r2X1 + r2
; (24)
pcr  2bB2 + rB1 + rB1X1   2abX1   ar + 2abX1   arX1
r2X21   4b2X1 + 2r2X1 + r2
: (25)
(2) For constant pv, pr and n, TPsc is concave in T .
T c 
s
2(nAr +Av)
prdrn2 + hv[Dvn2 + dr(n  1)n] + hrdrn  cv[Dvn2 + dr(   )n2] (26)
(3) For constant pv, pr and T , TPsc is concave in n.
nc 
s
2Av
prdrT 2 + hv[DvT 2 + drT 2]  cv[DvT 2 + dr(   )T 2] (27)
X1 = 1  nT2 ,
B1 =  hvbnT2 + hvr (n 1)T2 + hrr T2   cvb(1  nT2 ) + cvr(1  ( )nT2 ),
B2 = hvr
nT
2   hvb (n 1)T2   hrbT2 + cvr(1  nT2 )  cvb(1  ( )nT2 ).
Proposition 1 indicates that TPsc can be maximized for constant n and T . By updating the values of
n and T , the optimal decisions can be found. So, a multi-stages searching method is designed to determine
the optimal solutions for the model. The algorithm is presented in Tab.4.
3.6 Analysis of the decentralized problem
In this section, a decentralized supply chain is studied, in which both the vendor and the retailer make their
own decisions to maximize their individual prot. Firstly, the vendor, as the Stackelberg gaming leader,
determines its wholesale price w, the direct channel price pv and scale parameter n. Then, the retailer, as the
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Tab. 4 Algorithm to solve the centralized problem
Algorithm 1
Step 1: Input parameters , a, b, r, hv, hr, cv, Av, Ar, , . Set n = 1;
Step 2: Set k = 1. Initialize the value of T (k) = T k in which T = 10 2 is the searching
step size;
Step 3: Substitute T (k) and n into equations (24) and (25), and obtain the corresponding
values of p
(k)
v , p
(k)
r , TPsc

p
(k)
v ; p
(k)
r ; n; T
(k)

;
Step 4: Set k = k + 1, then T (k) = T  (k + 1). Go back to Step 3 and obtain the values
of p
(k+1)
v , p
(k+1)
r ,TPsc(n; T
(k+1); p
(k+1)
v ; p
(k+1)
r );
Step 5: Repeat Step 4, stop until k satises conditions
TPsc

n; T (k); p(k)v ; p
(k)
r

> TPsc

n; T (k 1); p(k 1)v ; p
(k 1)
r

;
TPsc

n; T (k); p(k)v ; p
(k)
r

> TPsc

n; T (k+1); p(k+1)v ; p
(k+1)
r

;
note k(n) = k, T

(n) = T
(k), pv(n) = p
(k)
v , p

r(n) = p
(k)
r and TP

sc(n) =
TPsc(n; T
(k); p
(k)
v ; p
(k)
r ).
Step 6: Set n = n + 1, repeat step 2-5 and obtain the corresponding values of k(n+1),
T (n+1), p

v(n+1), p

r(n+1), TP

sc(n+1).
Step 7: Repeat Step 6 until n satises
TP sc

n; p
()
v(n); p
()
r(n); T

(n)

> TP sc

n+ 1; p
()
v(n+1); p
()
r(n+1); T

(n+1)

;
TP sc

n; p
()
v(n); p
()
r(n); T

(n)

> TP sc

n  1; p()v(n 1); p()r(n 1); T (n 1)

:
Output nc = n, T c = T (nc),p
c
v = p

v(nc), p
c
r = p

r(nc), TP
c
sc = TP

sc(nc).
follower, sets its sales price pr and replenishment cycle length T based on the vendor's decisions. Properties
of the model are listed in proposition 2 and an algorithm is designed to nd the optimal equilibriums.
Proposition 2 When  and  are relatively small,
(1) For constant T and n, the optimal prices pdv , wd and pdr can be expressed respectively as
pdv  2bC2 + 2rC1   2ab  arX7 + ar + arX7
2(r2X7   2b2 + r2) ; (28)
wd  2b
2C1   r2C1   ab2X7 + ab2X7 + brX7C2   abrX7
X7b(r2X7   2b2 + r2) ; (29)
pdr  1
2b
((1  )a+ rpdv + bhrX4 + bX7wd): (30)
(2) For constant price parameters pv, pr, w and n, retailer's prot function is concave in T .
T d 
s
2Ar
prdrn+ hrdr + wdr(   )n (31)
(3) For constant price parameters pv, pr, w and T , vendor's prot function is concave in n.
nd 
s
2Av
wdr(   )T 2 + hv[DvT 2 + drT 2]  cv[DvT 2 + dr(   )T 2] (32)
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Tab. 5 Algorithm to solve the decentralized problem
Algorithm 2
Step 1: Input parameters , a, b, r, hv, hr, cv, Av, Ar, , . Set n = 1;
Step 2: Set k = 1. Initialize the value of T (k) = T k, in which T = 10 2 is the searching
step size;
Step 3: Substitute T (k) and n into equations (28)-(30) and obtain the corresponding values
of p
(k)
v , w
(k),p
(k)
r ,TPv

n; p
(k)
v ; w
(k)

, and TPr

T (k); p
(k)
r

;
Step 4: Set k = k + 1, then T (k) = T  (k + 1). Go back to Step 3 and obtain the values
of p
(k+1)
v , w
(k+1)
v , p
(k+1)
r , TPv

n; p
(k+1)
v ; w
(k+1)

and TPr

T (k+1); p
(k+1)
r

;
Step 5: Repeat Step 4, stop until k satises conditions
TPr

T (k); p(k)r

> TPr

T (k 1); p(k 1)r

;
TPr

T (k); p(k)r

> TPr

T (k+1); p(k+1)r

;
note k(n) = k, T

(n) = T
(k), pv(n) = p
(k)
v , p

r(n) = p
(k)
r , w

(n) = w
(k),
TP v (n; p
(k)
v ; w
(k)) and TP r(n)(T
(k); p
(k)
r ).
Step 6: Set n = n + 1, repeat step 2-5 and obtain the corresponding values
of k(n+1), T

(n+1), p

v(n+1), p

r(n+1), w

(n+1), TP

v

n+ 1; p
()
v(n+1); w
()
(n+1)

and
TP r(n+1)

T
()
(n+1); p
()
r(n+1)

.
Step 7: Repeat Step 6 until n satises
TP v

n; p
()
v(n); w
()
(n)

> TP v

n+ 1; p
()
v(n+1); w
()
(n+1)

;
TP v

n; p
()
v(n); w
()
(n)

> TP v

n  1; p()v(n 1); w()(n 1)

:
Output nd = n, T d = T (nd),p
d
v = p

v(nd), p
d
r = p

r(nd), w
d = w(nd), TP
d
v =
TP v(nd), TP
d
r = TP

r(nd).
X7 = 1  ( )nT2 n,
C1 =

hrbT
4 +
hvrnT
4   hvb(n 1)T4 +
cvr(1  nT2 )
2  
cvb(1  ( )nT2 )
2

(1  ( )nT2 )n,
C2 = hv
nT
2 (
r2
2b   b) + hvr(n 1)T4 + cv(1  nT2 )( r
2
2b   b) +
cv(1  ( )nT2 )r
2   hrrT4
Proposition 2 indicates that the equilibrium for the decentralized problem exists. However, due to the
complexity, the explicit solutions for parameters n and T can not be derive. Instead, another algorithm is
designed to solve the problem, which is presented in Tab.5.
4 Numerical tests
In this section, the proposed models are exemplied by numerical examples, in which the initial values of the
parameters are set as follows:  = 0:5, a = 500, b = 20, r = 5, hv = 0:05$/unit/time, hr = 0:2$/unit/time,
cv = 4$/unit, Av = 8000$, Ar = 100$,  = 0:01,  = 0:01. Superscripts ()c and ()d are used to denote
optimal decisions under centralized and decentralized problems respectively in the following analysis.
4.1 Examples for centralized and decentralized models
For the centralized model, using Algorithm 1, the optimal decisions can be determined: pcv = 10:99$/unit,
pcr = 11:22$/unit, T c = 2:92day, nc = 10. The maximum prot is TP csc = 562:34$.
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Tab. 6 Optimal centralized and decentralized decisions for dierent 
Centralized Supply Chain Decentralized supply chain
pcv p
c
r T
c nc TP c pdv w
d pdr T
d nd TPdv TP
d
r TP
d
0 10.72 11.04 3.50 11 690.25 10.83 10.82 13.16 2.94 15 581.05 33.87 614.92
0.005 10.86 11.14 3.30 10 624.77 10.98 10.85 13.23 2.85 13 516.93 32.82 549.75
 0.010 10.99 11.22 2.92 10 562.34 11.11 10.89 13.29 2.69 12 458.46 30.15 488.62
0.015 11.09 11.30 2.90 9 505.95 11.21 10.91 13.34 2.59 11 404.53 28.13 432.66
0.020 11.19 11.38 2.65 9 450.68 11.34 10.98 13.42 2.41 11 353.82 23.27 377.09
For the decentralized model, Algorithm 2 is utilized to search for the optimal decisions. For the vendor,
the optimal decision is pdv = 11:11$/unit, wd = 10:89$/unit, nd = 12, maximum prot is TP dv = 458:46$.
For the retailer, the optimal decision is pdr = 13:29$/unit, T d = 2:69day, maximum prot is TP dr = 30:15$.
The total prot of the supply chain is TP dsc = 488:62$, which is less than that of the centralized supply
chain.
In the centralized model, the Total Waste Rate ( dened as

1  Total DemandTotal Ordered Quantity

 100%) is
13.61%. However, in the decentralized model, the Total Waste Rate rises to 15.09%. So, it is worth noting
that supply chain integration not only results in higher prot, but also helps to reduce the wastes due to
product deterioration.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis on equilibrium strategies
In this subsection, sensitivity analysis is carried out on the equilibrium strategies with respect to key system
parameters , , , r, hv,hr,Av,Ar and cv by varying one parameter once and keeping other parameters
xed.
(1)Sensitivity analysis of deterioration rate 
Tab. 6 shows that, in both the centralized and the decentralized models, for a higher deterioration rate,
the direct channel price and the retail channel price increases. This is because a higher deterioration rate
means more products are wasted, thus leads to higher deterioration cost, especially for the vendor with
larger inventory holding quantities. To protect its prot margin, the rm has strong incentives to enhance
both channels' prices. Besides, when deterioration rate is higher, the vendor and the retailer suers more
from product deterioration. To reduce the waste rate and cut down the deterioration cost, the replenishment
cycles of the vendor and the retailer are compressed. In summary, in the two models, for the same value
of deterioration rate, the optimal price for the direct channel under decentralization is slightly higher than
that of the centralized model. Due to the double marginalization eect, the retail channel price in the
decentralized case is much higher than that of the centralized model.
Then, the average quantity and demand change with respect to deterioration rate is shown in Fig.
2(a). In both cases, the average purchased quantity is increasing in deterioration rate. However, on the
contrary, the increased average quantity does not result in the improvement of market demand. As it is
shown, demand rate decreases dramatically with deterioration rate. The gap between the average quantity
and the demand rate is expending with higher deterioration rate, which means the wasted quantity of the
products is increasing in deterioration rate. Although the size of the gaps for the decentralized and the
centralized cases are of similar sizes, the total waste rate in the decentralized case is higher than that of the
centralized model.
(2) Sensitivity analysis of quality losing rate 
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Tab. 7 Optimal centralized and decentralized decisions for dierent 
Centralized Supply Chain Decentralized supply chain
pcv p
c
r T
c nc TP c pdv w
d pdr T
d nd TPdv TP
d
r TP
d
0 11.09 11.21 3.04 10 617.12 11.18 10.82 13.30 3.04 11 485.80 47.16 532.96
0.005 11.03 11.21 2.97 10 588.39 11.11 10.82 13.29 2.89 11 471.41 39.68 511.08
 0.010 10.99 11.22 2.92 10 562.34 11.11 10.89 13.29 2.69 12 458.46 30.15 488.62
0.015 10.94 11.24 3.17 9 540.89 11.07 10.91 13.28 2.63 12 446.46 24.05 470.51
0.020 10.91 11.27 3.14 9 519.68 11.04 10.94 13.27 2.58 12 435.46 18.56 454.02
Tab. 8 Optimal centralized and decentralized decisions for dierent  and r
Centralized Supply Chain Decentralized supply chain
pcv p
c
r T
c nc TP c pdv w
d pdr T
d nd TPdv TP
d
r TP
d
0.450 10.46 11.69 2.85 10 557.67 10.60 11.42 14.09 2.30 14 407.37 47.82 455.19
0.475 10.72 11.45 2.89 10 557.05 10.86 11.16 13.69 2.49 13 430.84 38.56 469.39
 0.500 10.99 11.22 2.92 10 562.34 11.11 10.89 13.29 2.69 12 458.46 30.15 488.62
0.525 11.25 10.99 3.25 9 575.36 11.37 10.63 12.90 2.98 11 489.84 22.61 512.45
0.550 11.51 10.76 3.28 9 592.53 11.62 10.35 12.50 3.26 10 525.66 15.93 541.60
1 11.04 11.16 2.91 10 561.83 11.13 10.96 13.77 2.30 14 416.36 45.77 462.14
3 11.01 11.19 2.91 10 562.05 11.12 10.92 13.51 2.49 13 439.79 36.78 476.57
r 5 10.99 11.22 2.92 10 562.34 11.11 10.89 13.29 2.69 12 458.46 30.15 488.62
7 10.97 11.24 3.22 9 564.41 11.09 10.87 13.12 2.92 11 473.67 25.23 498.90
9 10.96 11.26 3.22 9 564.77 11.06 10.85 12.95 3.11 10 486.53 21.58 508.11
Under the decentralized scenario, Tab.7 shows that the direct channel price and retail channel price
decreases, while the wholesale price increases in . From economic point of view, when the quality drops
faster, the demand in the retail channel drops and the retailer will set a lower price to stimulate demand. For
the vendor, to get a higher direct channel demand and to mitigate the double marginalization eect, it will
set a lower direct channel price and a higher wholesale price. The drop of retail channel demand also leads
to a lower inventory holding quantity, so that the two parties' ordering cycles are shortened. It is natural
that higher quality losing rate leads to the drop of both parties' prot. Under the centralized scenario, as
 increases, pcv , pcr , T dv (T d  nd) and TP csc drops, which in line with the results in the decentralized
scenario.
Then, the average quantity and demand change with respect to quality losing rate  is shown in Fig.
2(b). In both cases, the average purchased quantity and total average demand decline in . As it is shown,
the average purchased quantity and total average demand drops in similar speed. The gap between the
average quantity and the demand rate is shrinking with higher , which means the wasted quantity of the
products is decreasing in . Although the size of the gaps for the decentralized and the centralized cases are
of similar sizes, the total waste rate in the decentralized case is higher than that of the centralized model.
(3) Sensitivity analysis for market share  and competition intensity r
Tab. 8 shows that, when the direct channel market share () increases, for both the centralized and de-
centralized models, the direct channel price increases while the retail channel price decreases. The wholesale
price drops with  in the decentralized case. The replenishment cycle for the retailer increases in  while
vendor's ordering cycle decreases in both cases. For the decentralized model, when direct channel market
share  increases, the vendor has more power in the market, so it can set a higher selling price. However,
for the retailer, to survive on the market, it would set a lower selling price. In order to balance the revenue
of the two channels, the vendor transfers some demand to the retailer by setting a lower wholesale price,
so that the retailer can set a lower price and increase the retailer channel demand. The market share of
direct channel contributes to the prot of the total supply chain prot under both cases and vendor's prot
under decentralized case. However, the retailer's prot is hurt due to the drop of its market power. In Fig.
2(c), it is depicted that the average quantity and demand are not sensitive to  in the centralized case.
However, under the decentralized case, the average quantity and demand both increase with , the gap
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Fig. 2 Average quantity and demand change with respect to (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) r
remains unchanged, which means the direct channel power contributes to the improvement of demand and
to the reduction of total waste.
Next, the inuence of competition intensity to the optimal decisions are studied. Based on Chen et al.
(2012), the competition intensity can be denoted as r, where r = b   b0 ( b0 is a constant). Note that,
when r = 0, there is no competition between the two channels. In this paper, b
0
is set as b
0
= 15, and the
corresponding sets of r and b are (r; b) = f(1; 16); (3; 18); (5; 20); (7; 22); (9; 24)g. The result is presented in
Tab. 8. It is shown that when the competition intensity increases, for both the centralized and decentralized
models, the direct channel price decreases. The retail channel price increases in the centralized model, while
decreases in the decentralized model. The ordering cycle of centralized model and the decentralized model are
increasing in the competition intensity. It shows in Fig. 2(d) that the average ordering quantity and prot
of centralized model are slightly sensitive to competition intensity. When competition intensity increases,
an integrated vendor should increase the price gap between the direct and the retail channel to keep the
demand, ordering quantity and prot stable. It also shows in Fig. 2(d) that both the average quantity
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and the demand increase with competition intensity in the decentralized case. For the decentralized model,
the intensied competition will push the retailer to set a lower selling price. In response, to maintain the
demand in both channels, the vendor will also set lower wholesale and direct selling price. This pricing
strategy helps to mitigate the double marginalization eect between the two parties, thus results in an
signicant enhancement of total supply chain prot. However, when the vendor acts as the game leader,
competition intensity only has positive eect on the vendors prot, while has negative eect on the retailers
prot. In summary, in the centralized model, competition intensity has minor eects to the protability of
the supply chain. In the decentralized model, intense competition will benet the vendor, while will hurt
the retailer. Numerically, Fig. 2(d) also tells that the gap between average quantity and demand is not
sensitive to competition intensity, while the waste rate drops under higher competition intensity.
(4) Sensitivity analysis for cost parameters hv, hr, Av, Ar, cv
We show the sensitivity results of hv, hr, Av, Ar and cv in Tab. 9. In the decentralized case, when the
vendor's inventory holding cost hv increases, p
d
v , p
d
r and w
d increase, whereas TP dv , TP dr and TP dsc
decrease. A larger inventory holding cost hv pushes the vendor to set higher selling and wholesale prices
so as to protect its sales margin. The retailer will also increase its selling price under a higher wholesale
price. The increase of prices results in the drop of market demand, thus leads to the drop of prot in both
channels and the total supply chain. Although the dropped demand rate results in lower total inventory
holding cost, it can not compensate the loss of demand decline. A similar rationale can be applied to the
centralized case, in which prices for the two channels pcv and pcr increase and total supply chain prot
TP csc decreases with a higher inventory holding cost hv.
For a higher value of hr, in the decentralized case, the vendor's wholesale price w
d decrease, while
the retailer's selling price pdr increases and ordering cycle T d decreases. It is common that the retailer
will enhance its market price and cut the ordering cycle to obtain higher sales margin and reduce its total
inventory holding cost, although it leads to the drop of retailer's ordering quantity. Thus, to stimulate the
retailer to order more products, the vendor sets a lower wholesale price. In the centralized case, higher
inventory holding cost in the retail channel leads to the rise of both channels' prices.
For a higher value of parameter Av, in the decentralized case, prices in the two channels (p
d
v , p
d
r
and wd) and ordering cycle of the vendor T dv (T d  nd) increase, while the retailer's ordering cycle T d
decreases. To reduce the high ordering cost, the vendor sets a longer ordering cycle. However, longer ordering
cycle means larger ordering quantity and inventory holding cost. To balance the xed ordering cost and total
inventory holding cost, the vendor also sets higher prices to keep a low demand rate, thus it can achieve
smaller ordering quantity, lower inventory level and lower inventory holding cost. No doubt that the increase
of ordering cost leads to the drop of both rms' prot. A simple rationale can be applied to explain why
prices and prot drops in the centralized case.
As the retailer's ordering cost Ar increase, under the decentralized scenario, the retailer's ordering cycle
T d increase without doubt. The vendor's ordering cycle T dv (T d  nd) increases in Ar. The prices pdv ,
pdr in the two channels increase, while wd decreases in parameter Ar. This is because for a higher Ar, the
retailer's ordering frequency nd drops, which leads to the rise of the vendor's inventory holding costs. To
encourage the retailer to order more products, the vendor oers a lower wholesale price. All these leads to
the drop of the total prot, vendor's and retailer's prot under higher value of Ar. In the centralized case,
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the Ar is an internal operating cost, which has small impacts to the pricing decisions, but has negative
impacts to the total prot.
For a higher procurement cost cv, in the decentralized and the centralized case, the prices p
d
v , p
d
r , w
d
and ordering cycle increase T d, while total prot TP dsc , vendor's prot TP dv and retailer's TP dr prot
drop. In the centralized case, pricespcv , pcr , wc, ordering cycle T c increases, while the total prot TP csc
decreases in cv. It is because, when procurement cost increases, rms need to set higher selling prices, which
leads to the drop of market demand. Also, to reduce its inventory cost, the vendor should set a longer
ordering cycle.
Tab. 9 Optimal centralized and decentralized decisions for dierent hv , hr, Av , Ar and cv
Centralized Supply Chain Decentralized supply chain
pcv p
c
r T
c nc TP c pdv w
d pdr T
d nd TPdv TP
d
r TP
d
Default 10.99 11.22 2.92 10 562.34 11.11 10.89 13.29 2.69 12 458.46 30.15 488.62
-40% 10.88 11.14 2.90 11 610.41 10.99 10.81 13.24 2.73 13 505.14 31.37 536.52
hv -20% 10.93 11.18 3.03 10 586.47 11.03 10.82 13.25 2.73 12 481.02 32.01 513.02
20% 11.03 11.26 3.11 9 541.31 11.130 10.89 13.30 2.73 11 436.82 31.30 468.12
40% 11.08 11.29 3.01 9 519.47 11.20 10.95 13.33 2.68 11 416.60 29.62 446.22
-40% 10.98 11.17 4.12 7 577.79 11.13 10.93 13.25 2.84 11 461.95 34.97 496.92
hr -20% 10.98 11.20 3.23 9 568.61 11.12 10.90 13.29 2.73 12 460.07 31.08 491.15
20% 10.99 11.24 2.90 10 558.27 11.10 10.86 13.30 2.66 12 456.77 29.24 486.00
40% 11.00 11.26 2.65 11 552.90 11.09 10.83 13.31 2.65 12 455.00 28.34 483.34
-40% 10.82 11.03 2.81 8 690.56 10.91 10.64 13.17 3.09 8 570.93 42.61 613.54
Av -20% 10.91 11.13 2.89 9 622.34 11.01 10.77 13.231 2.86 10 511.13 36.03 547.16
20% 11.06 11.31 3.19 10 509.89 11.20 11.00 13.35 2.56 14 410.85 24.82 435.67
40% 11.13 11.38 3.15 11 460.26 11.26 11.06 13.39 2.52 15 367.21 22.33 389.55
-40% 10.97 11.19 2.60 11 575.50 11.09 10.99 13.26 1.67 19 461.14 33.29 494.43
Ar -20% 10.98 11.21 2.88 10 569.24 11.08 10.91 13.26 2.23 14 459.59 33.15 492.75
20% 10.99 11.23 3.25 9 557.89 11.10 10.82 13.30 3.21 10 457.16 29.46 486.62
40% 11.00 11.24 3.28 9 551.76 11.11 10.79 13.31 3.62 9 456.01 27.16 483.17
-40% 10.03 10.30 2.86 10 875.83 10.13 9.99 12.69 2.41 13 721.70 52.44 774.14
cv -20% 10.51 10.75 2.88 10 713.06 10.64 10.47 13.01 2.52 13 584.76 39.38 624.14
20% 11.47 11.69 2.97 10 423.78 11.57 11.31 13.58 2.91 11 342.26 21.92 364.18
40% 11.96 12.18 3.36 9 299.38 12.12 11.80 13.91 3.10 11 236.37 11.96 248.33
5 Supply chain coordination
In this section, a revenue sharing and two part tari contract is utilized to coordinate the supply chain.
When adopting the contract, the retailer commits to share a proportion of  of its revenue with the vendor
and the vendor sets a lower wholesale price w. Then, the two rms negotiate on the lump sum fee F based
on their powers. Use superscript ()co to denote the parameters under supply chain coordination.
5.1 Supply chain coordination with a revenue sharing and two part tari contract
The unit time total prots of the retailer and the vendor are respectively given as
TP cor =
1
nT
[(1  )SRr   PCr  HCr  OCr]
=
1
nT
f(1  )prdr 1  e
 nT

  hr dr
   

eT   1

  e
T   1


1  e nT
eT   1
 w dr
    (e
( )T   1)1  e
 nT
1  e T   nArg+ F: (33)
TP cov =
1
nT
[SRr + SRv +WRv  HCv   PCv  OCv]
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=
1
nT
fprdr 1  e
 nT

+ pvDvnT + w
dr
    (e
( )T   1)1  e
 nT
1  e T
 hvDv e
nT   nT   1
2
  hv dr
(   )

e( )nT (e nT   1) + (eT   1)1  e
 nT
eT   1

 cvDv

(enT   1)  cv dr
    (e
( )nT   1) Avg   F: (34)
In the above two functions, it is shown that when F is negative, the lump sum fee is transferred from
the retailer to the vendor. The following proposition characterizes the conditions that a revenue sharing and
two part tari contract can coordinate the decentralized supply chain.
Proposition 3 When  and  are relatively small, the supply chain coordination can be achieved through
a revenue sharing and two part tari contract only if the mechanism (co, wco, F ) satises
co = 1  b(2  (   )n
cT c)(hrd
c
r   2Ar=T c2) + dcrhr(   )bncT c
(dcr   bpcr)dcr(ncT c   2)(   )nc + pcrdcrb((   )ncT c   2)nc 2 [0; 1]; (35)
wco =
(dcr   bpcr)(2  ncT c)(2Ar=T c2   hrdcr) + pcrdcrbhrT cnc
(dcr   bpcr)dcr(ncT c   2)(   )nc + pcrdcrb((   )ncT c   2)nc > 0; (36)
F 2 fTP cor (co; wco; F ) > TP dr ; TP cov (co; wco; F ) > TP dv g; (37)
in which dcr = (1  )a  bpcr + rpcv,
pcv; p
c
r; n
c; T c are the optimal decisions in the centralized model,
According to the contract structure, three coordinating tools can be used by both players to establish a
ecient solution, i.e., the wholesale price, the revenue sharing rate, and the lump sum fee. In this contract,
F co is in the range [F ; F ], which allows the retailer to earn no less prot than that available in the decen-
tralized model (TP dr ). Consider TP dr as the retailer's reservation prot-the lowest prot level at which
the retailer can accept the contract. (33) and (34) show that higher F co benets the retailer, whereas lower
F co benets the vendor. Negotiating the value of F co depends heavily on the bargain power of the retailer
and the vendor in the supply chain.
5.2 The optimal lump sum fee
Nash bargain method can be applied to determine the optimal F , which can achieve the Pareto improvement.
According to Baron et al. (2016), Nash bargain function B(F ) is modeled as follows
B(F ) = [TP cov (
co; wco; F )  TP dv ] [TP cor (co; wco; F )  TP dr ]1  : (38)
The goal of the negotiation is to maximize Nash bargain function B(F ) by nding an optimal F . In the
function, parameter ; ( 2 [0; 1]) denotes the vendor's bargain power. The optimal F can be obtained by
solving the equation @B(F )@F = 0, which is shown in Proposition 4.
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Proposition 4 For xed , the optimal lump sum fee is
F co = [TP cov (
co; wco; F = 0)  TP dv ](1  )  [TP cor (co; wco; F = 0)  TP dr ]: (39)
Proposition 4 shows that the optimal lump sum fee is decreasing in the vendor's bargain power.
5.3 An example
The objective of this subsection is to gain further insights of the coordination strategy through numerical
tests. The parameters in the base model are also used in this subsection. Substituting the parameters
into equations (35) and (36), the coordinating revenue sharing rate can be obtained as co = 0:698, the
wholesale price is wco = 1:86$/unit. The prot of the retailer under coordination is TP cor = 50:82$+F , and
the vendor's prot is TP cov = 511:52$  F . The prot of the vendor, the retailer and the supply chain with
and without coordination are plotted in Fig.3 with respect to F . Considering the condition in equation
(37), by choosing a proper value of F in the range F 2 [ 20:66; 53:06], the coordinated supply chain can
reach Pareto improving. For a xed , the optimal lump sum fee is F co = 50:06  73:72. In this example,
the negativity of F co means the lump sum fee is transferred from the retailer to the vendor.
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The impacts of parameters ,  on the eciency of the coordinating contract under xed  are studied.
i =
TP coi  TP di
TP di
 100% denotes the Percentage Prot Increase of i; (i = v; r; sc), which also captures the
coordination eciency of the contract. Fig.4 (a) and (b) depict i with respect to parameters  and .
It is shown in Fig.4(a), for the vendor, the retailer and the supply chain, the coordination eciency
increases in the product deteriorating rate . It means that, supply chain members are more willing to
coordinate with each other when deterioration rate is high. Comparing v and r, the retailer will benet
more from coordination. It is depicted in Fig.4(b) that when the quality of the product drops more fast,
the coordination eciency for the retailer rises rapidly. However, the coordination eciency of the vendor
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Fig. 4 Percentage prot increase with respect to (a)  and (b)  when  = 0:9
drops slightly. In another word, when quality drops more fast, the retailer is more willing to coordinate with
the vendor. But quality dropping rate has no signicant impacts to the vendor's coordinating eciency.
6 Extension: delivery time as a decision variable
In this section, the direct channel delivery time, i.e., L, is assumed to be an endogenous parameter. In real
life, when the direct channel delivery time is longer, more customers will switch from the direct channel to
the retail channel. Following Hua et al. (2010), it is assumed that the direct channel demand is decreasing
in L, while the retail channel demand is increasing in L. Then, the demand functions for the two channels
can be formulated as
DLv = a  bpv + rpr   s1L; (40)
DLr = [(1  )a  bpr + rpv + s2L]e t; t 2 [0; nT ]: (41)
in which, s1 and s2 are the lead time sensitivity of the demands in the direct and retail channel, respectively.
Here, the delivery time L is controllable, which incurs an investment cost cL(L). Assuming the cost cL(L)
is decreasing and convex in L, which follows the law of Diminishing Marginal Utility. Similar to Hua et al.
(2010), the cost is formulated as cL(L) =
s3
L+s4
. Note [(1  )a  bpr + rpv + s2L] as dLr in equation (41).
Under the consideration of endogenous delivery time, the two rms' prot can be formulated as
TPLr (pr; T ) =
1
nT
fprdLr 1  e
 nT

  hr d
L
r
   

eT   1

  e
T   1


1  e nT
eT   1
 w d
L
r
    (e
( )T   1)1  e
 nT
1  e T   nArg: (42)
TPLv (pv; w; n; L) =
1
nT
fpvDLv nT + w d
L
r
    (e
( )T   1)1  e
 nT
1  e T
 hvDLv e
nT   nT   1
2
  hv d
L
r
(   )

e( )nT (1  e nT ) + (eT   1)1  e
 nT
1  eT

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 cvD
L
v

(enT   1)  cv d
L
r
    (e
( )nT   1) Avg   cL(L): (43)
In the centralized model, the two rms make decision together to maximize the total prot by deciding
optimal pv, pr, T , n and L. In the decentralized model, as the leader, the vendor rst determines pv, w, n
and L; then, the retailer sets pr and T optimally based on the vendor's strategies. Considering endogenous
direct channel delivery time makes the model more complex and it is hard to obtain the analytical results.
Numerical tests are conducted to nd some important managerial insights. Values for parameters of s1, s2,
s3 and s4 are set as 10, 5, 100 and 1, respectively. Other parameters are set as that in the base model.
For constant L, the optimal pricing decisions and inventory decisions in the centralized and decentralized
models can be obtained by utilizing Algorithm 1 and 2, respectively. Then, with iteration of parameter L,
the optimal delivery time can be found.
It is shown in Fig.5 that, in the centralized supply chain, the total prot is concave in L and the optimal
point is Lc = 0:86 day. Then, in the decentralized model, the vendor's prot is also concave in L and the
optimal point is Ld = 0:61 day. It is found that, in the decentralized supply chain, the vendor should invest
more to shorten the delivery time comparing to the centralized model, which conforms to the conclusions
in Hua et al. (2010).
The sensitivity analysis of optimal delivery time in the centralized and decentralized models with respect
to  and  are also conducted, which are shown in Fig.6 (a)-(b). When deterioration rate () rises, the
vendor will invest less in reducing the delivery time in both the decentralized and centralized models. This is
because shorter delivery time contributes to the total demand rate, while, it also results in the deterioration
of more products. Thus, to avoid the deterioration cost, the vendor has less incentives to reduce the delivery
lead time when  is higher. When the quality dropping rate () is higher, in both models, vendor will invest
more to achieve a shorter delivery time. This is because higher  results in quicker shrink of retail channel
demand. To decelerate the demand dropping, the vendor should invest more on the delivery time and attract
more customers.
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7 Conclusions
Nowadays, dual-channel supply chain structure, i.e., a traditional retailer channel and an online direct chan-
nel, is widely adopted by some companies selling deteriorating products. However, few literature considers
about the deterioration property of products in dual-channel supply chain decisions. To ll this gap, central-
ized and decentralized models of a dual-channel supply chain for deterioration products with a vendor and
a retailer are established. The two rms make decisions on pricing and inventory under channel competition
and product deterioration. In the centralized model, the vendor and the retailer make decisions together to
maximize the total prot of the supply chain. In the decentralized model, the vendor and retailer competes
with each other and follows a Stackelberg gaming sequence in which the vendor acts as the leader. Due to
the complexity of the models, no explicit solution can be obtained by calculation. Thus, two algorithms are
proposed to solve the models.
The key ndings are obtained through model analysis and numerical tests. The impacts of critical
parameters (deterioration rate, competition intensity, inventory holding cost, ordering cost, etc.) to the price
and inventory decisions are presented, from which, some interesting and meaningful results are summarized.
In addition, it is found that a revenue sharing and two part tari contract can coordinate the supply
chain. Under applying the coordination contract, the total waste rate of the supply chain declines. In the
extension, the optimal direct channel delivery time is studied. Results show that the vendor will invest more
in reducing the delivery lead time in the decentralized model than in the centralized model. In addition,
in both models, vendor will set a higher delivery lead time when deterioration rate is higher or quality
dropping rate is smaller.
There are still some limitations of this paper. Firstly, in this paper, the deterioration rate does not change
with time. However, in some cases, deterioration rate is not a constant, and it often changes with time. For
example, Qin et al. (2014) and Chauhan & Singh (2015) assumed that the deterioration rate is increasing
in time. Skouri et al. (2009) studied an inventory model with Weibull deterioration rate. Shah et al. (2013)
studied a model with non-instantaneously deteriorating products with time dependent deterioration rate. In
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the future research, this study can be extended by incorporating time dependent deterioration rate. Secondly,
the deterioration cost is not considered in this paper. However, in some conditions, companies also need to
pay when dealing with the wastes (Zhang et al., 2015; Qin et al., 2014). In the future, deteriorating cost
will be introduced to the model. Thirdly, it is assumed that only retail channel customers are sensitive to
the products' quality because they can touch and feel the quality before their purchase. This assumption
can also be relaxed by assuming both channel's customers are sensitive to products' quality in future study.
Fourthly, in this study, the vendor is the Stackelberg leader in the dual-channel supply chain. In future
research, models with a leading retailer can also be studied.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof The inventory level in the nth phase in time interval t 2 [(n   1)T; nT ] satises the dierential equation _Ivn(t) =
 Ivn(t) Dv ; t 2 [(n  1)T; nT ] with boundary condition Ivn(t = nT ) = 0.
Solving the equation, the inventory level in the nth phase is
Ivn(t) =
Dv

(e(nT t)   1); t 2 [(n  1)T; nT ]: (44)
Then, solving the dierential equation in the (n 1)th phase, i.e., _Iv(n 1)(t) =  Iv(n 1)(t) Dv ; t 2 [(n 2)T; (n 1)T ]
with boundary condition Iv(n 1)[t = (n   1)T ]   Ivn[t = (n   1)T ] = Qrn, the inventory level in time interval t 2
[(n  2)T; (n  1)T ] can be solved as
Iv(n 1)(t) =
Dv

(e(nT t)   1) +Qrne((n 1)T t); t 2 [(n  2)T; (n  1)T ]: (45)
Following the same approach, the inventory level in time interval t 2 [(n  3)T; (n  2)T ] is
Iv(n 2)(t) =
Dv

(e(nT t)   1) +Qrne(n 1)T t +Qr(n 1)e((n 2)T t); t 2 [(n  3)T; (n  2)T ]: (46)
Finally, the inventory level in time interval t 2 [0; T ] is
Iv1(t) =
Dv

(e(nT t)   1) +Qrne((n 1)T t) +Qr(n 1)e((n 2)T t) + :::+Qr2e(T t); t 2 [0; T ]: (47)
Based on the above analysis, the inventory level can be inducted as
Ivj(t) =
Dv

(e(nT t)   1) + dr
    (e
( )nT   e( )jT )e t; t 2 [(j   1)T; jT ]; j = 1; 2; :::; n: (48)
This ends the proof of Lemma 1. ut
B Proof of Proposition 1
Proof Before the proof, some denitions are made:
X1 =
1 e nT
nT
, X2 =
enT nT 1
2nT
, X3 =
1
( )nT

e( )nT (1  e nT ) + (eT   1) 1 e nT
1 eT

,
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X4 =
1
( )nT

eT 1

  eT 1


1 e nT
eT 1 , X5 =
1
nT
(enT   1), X6 = 1( )nT (e( )nT   1),
X7 =
1
( )nT (e
( )T   1) 1 e nT
1 e T .
The prot function can be rewritten as
TPsc = pvDv + prdrX1   hvDvX2   hvdrX3   hrdrX4   cvDvX5   cvdrX6   Ar
T
  Av
nT
: (49)
(1)When n and T are xed, taking the second order derivative of TPsc with respect to pv and pr , the Hessian matrix
can be obtained as
H =
0@ @2TPsc@p2v @2TPsc@pv@pr
@2TPsc
@pr@pv
@2TPsc
@p2r
1A =
0@  2b (1 +X1)r
(1 +X1)r  2b
1A : (50)
When the quality losing rate  is not very large and b > r, jHj = 4b2   (1 + X1)2r2 > 0 is satised. Also @
2TPsc
@p2v
=
 2b < 0, so TPsc is jointly concave in pv and pr. When equating both @TPsc@pv and
@TPsc
@pr
to zero, the optimal prices can be
obtained by solving the equation set, which can be expressed as
P cv =
B2r + 2bB1X1 + rX1B2   arX1   arX21 + arX21   2abX1 + arX1
r2X21   4b2X1 + 2r2X1 + r2
; (51)
P cr =
2bB2 + rB1 + rB1X1   2abX1   ar + 2abX1   arX1
r2X21   4b2X1 + 2r2X1 + r2
; (52)
in which B1 =  hvbX2 + hvrX3 + hrrX4   cvbX5 + cvrX6, B2 = hvrX2   hvbX3   hrbX4 + cvrX5   cvbX6.
(2)For xed pv ,pr and n, there is only one decision parameter T .
Taking the second derivative of the prot function with respect to T , we have
@2TPsc
@T 2
= prdrX
00
1   hvDvX
00
2   hvdrX
00
3   hrdrX
00
4   cvDvX
00
5   cvdrX
00
6  
2Av
nT 3
  2Ar
T 3
: (53)
For X
00
1 =
e nT
T
+ e
 nT 1
nT2
. When setting x =  nT , X001 = xe
 x+e x 1
nT2
. Dening a new function F (x) =
xe x + e x   1. When x ! 0, X001 = 0. The rst derivative of F (x) satises F
0
(x) =  xe x < 0 . Thus in the interval
T 2 (0;+1),X001 < 0 holds.
For X
00
2 =
1
2nT3
(2n2T 2enT  2nTenT +2enT  2) , set x = nT and dene a new function F (x) = x2ex 2xex+
2ex   2 in which x 2 (0;+1). When x ! 0, F (x) = 0 and the rst derivative satises F 0 (x) = x2ex > 0. Thus, in the
interval T 2 (0;+1), X002 > 0 always holds.
The proofs of X
00
i > 0, (i = 3; 4; 5; 6) are the same as X
00
2 > 0. Finally, the second derivative of prot function satises
@2TPsc
@T2
< 0, and TPsc is concave in T.
(3) Taking the second derivative of the prot function with respect to T , we have
@2TPsc
@n2
= prdrX
00
1   hvDvX
00
2   hvdrX
00
3   hrdrX
00
4   cvDvX
00
5   cvdrX
00
6  
2Av
n3T
: (54)
For X
00
1 =
e nT
n
+ e
 nT 1
n2T
. When setting x =  nT , X001 = xe
 x+e x 1
nT2
. Dening a new function F (x) =
xe x + e x   1. When x ! 0, X001 = 0. The rst derivative of F (x) satises F
0
(x) =  xe x < 0 . Thus in the interval
T 2 (0;+1),X001 < 0 holds.
For X
00
2 =
1
2n3T
(2n2T 2enT  2nTenT +2enT  2) , set x = nT and dene a new function F (x) = x2ex 2xex+
2ex   2, for x 2 (0;+1) . When x! 0, F (x) = 0 and the rst derivative satises F 0 (x) = x2ex > 0 . Thus in the interval
n 2 (0;+1),X002 > 0 holds.
The proofs of X
00
i > 0, i = 3; 4; 5; 6 are the same as X
00
2 > 0. Finally, the second derivative of prot function satises
@2TPsc
@n2
< 0, and TPsc is concave in n.
In the above analysis, we proved the existence and uniqueness for the decision variables. To obtain the analytical results,
we approximate the exponential terms and solve equations @TPsc
@n
= 0 and @TPsc
@n
= 0, respectively. We use the Taylor
expansion to approximate exponential terms. For example, the term eT 1 is approximated to eT  1  1+T+ 2T2
2
 1 =
T + 
2T2
2
. Thus, we obtain the nal results in Proposition 1.
This ends the proof of Proposition 1. ut
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C Proof of Proposition 2
Proof The vendor's prot function can be expressed as
TPv = pvDv + wdrX7   hvDvX2   hvdrX3   cvDvX5   cvdrX6   Av
nT
: (55)
The retailer's prot function can be expressed as
TPr = prdrX1   hrdrX4   wdrX7   Ar
T
: (56)
(1)When T and n are xed, the value ofXi; (i = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7) are determined. Equating the rst derivative of retailer's
prot function to zero, the optimal price can be derived as
pr(pv ; w) =
1
2b
((1  )a+ rpv + bhrX4 + bX7w): (57)
Substitute it into demand function, we have
Dv(pv ; w) = (
r(1  )
2b
+ )a+ (
r2
2b
  b)pv + 1
2
rhrX4(T ) +
1
2
rwX7(T ); (58)
dr(pv ; w) =
(1  )a
2
+
1
2
rpv   1
2
bhrX4   1
2
bwX7: (59)
Substitute the demand functions into vendor's prot function, and take the rst derivative of TPv with respect to pv
and w, there is @
2TPv
@w2
=  bX27 , @
2TPv
@p2v
= r
2
b
  2b, @2TPv
@w@pv
= @
2TPv
@pv@w
= rX7. The Hessian matrix is
H =
0@ @2TPv@w2 @2TPv@w@pv
@2TPv
@pv@w
@2TPv
@p2v
1A =
0@ bX27 rX7
rX7
r2
b
  2b
1A (60)
For @
2TPv
@w2
=  bX27 < 0, jHj = (b2   r2)X27 > 0, vendor's prot function is jointly concave in pv and w. And the
optimal solution can be derived from the rst order conditions.
@TPv(pv ;pr(pv;w);w)
@pv
= 0;
@TPv(pv;pr(pv ;w);w)
@w
= 0: Then the optimal prices can be determined as
pdv =
2bC2 + 2rC1   2ab  arX7 + ar + arX7
2(r2X7   2b2 + r2)
; (61)
wd =
2b2C1   r2C1   ab2X7 + ab2X7 + brX7C2   abrX7
X7b(r2X7   2b2 + r2)
; (62)
pdr =
1
2b
((1  )a+ rpdv + bhrX4 + bX7wd); (63)
in which C1 =
hrbX4X7
2
+ hvrX2X7
2
  hvbX3X7
2
+ cvrX5X7
2
  cvbX6X7
2
, C2 = hvX2(
r2
2b
  b)+ hvrX3
2
+ cvX5(
r2
2b
  b)+
cvX6r
2
  hrrX4
2
(2)Taking the second derivative of retailer's prot function with respect to T , we have
@2TPr
@T 2
= prdrX
00
1   hrdrX
00
4   wdrX
00
7  
2Ar
T 3
: (64)
As proved in proposition 1, X
00
1 < 0 , X
00
4 > 0 and X
00
7 > 0 are satised. Thus
@2TPr
@T2
< 0, and retailer's prot function
is concave in T .
(3)Taking the second derivative of vendor's prot function with respect to n ,
@2TPv
@n2
= wdrX
00
7   hvDvX
00
2   hvdrX
00
3   cvDvX
00
5   cvdrX
00
6 (n) 
2Ar
n3T
: (65)
As proved in proposition 1, X
00
i > 0 .i = 2; 3; 5; 6. For X
00
7 =
1
( )nT (e
( )T   1) 2T2e nT
1 e T < 0. Finally, the second
derivative of retailer's prot function satises @
2TPv
@n2
< 0 , thus TPv is concave in n. Although is an integer variable, it is
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obvious that there exists a unique value of n that maximize the prot function when pv , pr and T are constant.
In the above analysis, we proved the existence and uniqueness for the decision variables. To obtain the analytical
results, we approximate the exponential terms and solve equations @TPr
@T
= 0 and @TPv
@n
= 0, respectively. We use the
Taylor expansion to approximate exponential terms. We obtain the nal results in Proposition 2.
This ends the proof of Proposition 2. ut
D Proof of Proposition 3
Proof For any given w,  and F , the retailer's retail price pr and ordering cycle T should satisfy
@TP cor
@pr
jpr=pcr = 0; (66)
@TP cor
@T
jT=Tc = 0: (67)
Taking the rst order partial derivative of (31) with respect to pr and T and setting them to zero yields
@TP cor
@pr
= (1  )(1  nT=2)((1  )a  2bpr + rpv) + hrbT=2 + wb(1  (   )nT=2) = 0; (68)
@TP cor
@T
= (1  )prdr( n=2)  hrdr=2  wdr( (   )n=2) +Ar=T 2 = 0: (69)
Substituting pr = pcr and T = T
c into the two equations and solving (;w), the expressions of co and wco in proposition
3 can be obtained. In addition, both parties' prot should be no less than that without coordination. Thus the lump sum
fee need to satisfy
F 2 fTP cor (co; wco; F ) > TP dr ; TP cov (co; wco; F ) > TP dv g: (70)
This ends the proof of Proposition 3. ut
E Proof of Proposition 4
Proof Calculating the rst and second order derivative of B(F ) as follows
@B(F )
@F
= f(1  )[TP cov (co; wco; F = 0)  TP dv   F ]  [TP cor (co; wco; F = 0)  TP dr + F ]g 
[TP cov (
co; wco; F = 0)  TP dv   F ] 1[TP cor (co; wco; F = 0)  TP dr ]  : (71)
@2B(F )
@F 2
=  (1  )[TP cov (co; wco; F = 0)  TP dv   F ] 2[TP cor (co; wco; F = 0)  TP dr + F ]  1 
[TP cov (
co; wco; F = 0)  TP dv + TP cor (co; wco; F = 0)  TP dr ]2: (72)
The second order derivative
@2B(F )
@F2
is negative, which means there exists an optimal F that maximize the function.
Equating
@B(F )
@F
to zero, the optimal F can be obtained as
F  = (TP cor (
co; wco; F = 0)  TP dv )  (1  )  (TP cor (co; wco; F = 0)  TP dr )  : (73)
This ends the proof of Proposition 4. ut
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